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Abstract
The relationship between legal offenses and punishment is well studied by scholars of
sociology, economics and law. Economists contend that punishment is a cost of committing
an offense, hence an increase in the severity of punishments should decrease incentives to
commit legal offenses. And the efficiency of legal punishments are studied generally from
this perspective: giving efficient incentives to commit legal offense. This paper studies the
relationship between punishment and evidence disclosure in a game theoretical model. A
defendant is trying to persuade a judge by presenting evidence to take a favorable legal ac-
tion rather than less favorable ones on his case. I show that the equilibrium disclosure of the
defendant is not affected by a change in the scale of legal actions when there is no uncer-
tainty on how the judge evaluates evidence. With uncertainty, however, the defendant can
be induced to disclose more information by decreasing the severity ratio of the most unfa-
vorable legal action to the most favorable one. This shows that in the more realistic case of
uncertainty the severity of punishments has an effect on evidence disclosure and efficiency
of punishment schedule should be analyzed by internalizing its effect on evidence disclosure
as well.
Severity of punishments has been analyzed from the angle of efficiency by several scholars
and he extent of the effectiveness of legal punishments in deterring legal offenses have been ex-
tensively studied and debated. 1 In his seminal paper, Becker (1968) analyzed optimality of legal
1For a survey of empirical papers that support the argument that punishment is indeed a deterrent to criminal
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punishments using a model in which the offenders are rational decision makers who perceives le-
gal punishments as a cost of crime and decides on whether to commit crime accordingly. Recent
papers like Dezhbakhsh, Rubin, and Shepherd (2003), Mocan and Gittings (2003) and Donohue
and Wolfers (2009) studied the effect of capital punishment on murders and hence contributed to
the discussion on the effect of severity on legal offenses. In contrast to the focus of previous liter-
ature on legal punishments, my paper studies the relationship between punishment and evidence
disclosure.
Evidence production is crucial for accuracy of the legal process as Posner (1999) contends.
To see the importance of evidence production consider an increase in the amount of evidence
produced during trials. This would lead to an increase in the accuracy of the legal procedure
which in turn would increase the confidence in the legal system and hence affect incentives to
commit crime. Hence, to have a complete analysis of optimality of punishments, punishments
should also be analyzed in relation to evidence disclosures. Evidence disclosures are crucial for
courts to make informed legal decisions. How much evidence a defendant discloses in court
depends on what results these disclosures may lead to, which in turn depends on the severity
of punishments. This paper studies the relationship between the severity of legal punishments
and evidence disclosed in courts. The model proposed in this paper is general enough to address
different kinds of cases like cases in criminal, tort or contract law, I use the example of a tort case
to illustrate the specifics and the results of the model.
Consider the example of a judge trying to decide on the punishment for a defendant in a tort
case. The defendant has a piece of evidence that the defendant can either disclose it or suppress
it but cannot modify it in any other sense as in Bull and Watson (2007) and Bull and Watson
(2004). I restrict my attention to the cases in which the sole provider of information about the
evidence is the defendant; neither judge nor any other agent can investigate the matter themselves
and find evidence. As discussed in Shin (1994), the possibility that the defendant is uninformed
leads the judge to make non-trivial inferences when the defendant does not answer a question
or suppress information. I focus on the relationship between the defendants’ decision and the
severity of legal actions he is facing. To solidify the abstract situation even further, assume that
the defendant is a producer whose product has harmed a consumer. The judge determines the
activity, see Tullock (1974).
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extent of compensation according to whether the producer has been irresponsible or not, among
other factors. If the product was tested for a specific characteristic before it was sent into the
market, the producer may choose to present the test results. The judge might choose a small
compensation payment upon seeing favorable test results or might choose a high compensation
amount if the test results show that the producer was irresponsible. The producer may not be
certain how the evidence he presents would affect his case, so the producer weights the risk of
being perceived as irresponsible against the possibility of being perceived as an unlucky person
who made the best possible decision under the light of what he knows. The severity of legal
punishments would surely affect the decision of the producer.
Throughout the paper I focus on the case that the defendant faces some uncertainty about
how the evidence would affect the decision on his case. There are two reasons for this. First,
judicial decision making bodies, the judge hereon, exhibit a wide variety of point of views when
it comes to interpreting laws, due to their private knowledge, previous experiences, political
views etc. Hence assuming that the defendant faces uncertainty about how the evidence is going
to affect his case is a realistic assumption. Secondly, the case that the defendant knows the effect
of the evidence on his case with certainty is a special case of persuasion games that has been
analyzed thoroughly in the literature in Milgrom (1981), Dye (1986), Shin (1994), Glazer and
Rubinstein (2004), Glazer and Rubinstein (2006), Sher (2010) and Sher (Forthcoming). These
papers analyzed similar games of communication and it is clear that beneficial evidence is going
to be presented, whereas harmful evidence is going to be suppressed. This paper contributes
to the literature of evidence disclosure and persuasion games in two ways. First, I extend the
model in Che and Severinov (2007) so that evidence can have a positive, negative or negligible
effect on the case for the defendant rather than having a binary effect of punishing or acquitting
the defendant. Enriching the set of legal consequences the evidence might have enables me
to propose a definition of severity of legal consequences. Second, I compare the effect of a
change in the scale of legal actions on the disclosures of the defendant when there is uncertainty
about the judge’s type and when there is no uncertainty; uncertainty proves to be an important
characteristic that determines whether severity of punishments would or would not have any
affect on the disclosures of the defendant. Following the tort case example in which the schedule
of legal punishments is in the form of a monetary compensation that the defendant has to pay. I
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show that:
1. The equilibrium disclosure of the producer is not affected by a change in the compensation
schedule when there is no uncertainty on the type of the listener (judge).
2. With uncertainty, however, the defendant can be induced to disclose more information by
decreasing the severity of compensation schedule.
3. The defendant would disclose less information when the severity of compensation schedule
is increased.
This implies that uncertainty leads to a negative relationship between the disclosures of the
defendant and the severity of legal actions. In cases where the producer knows how the evidence
will be perceived by the judge, a change in the compensation schedule does not affect what evi-
dence he suppresses and what evidence he discloses. The severity of the compensation schedule
would affect the producer’s evidence disclosure behavior only if the producer faced uncertainty
about how the judge evaluates the evidence. In general, in a legal system in which there is no
uncertainty and every contingency is well-defined by laws, a change in the size legal actions does
not affect incentives to disclose evidence. However, in a legal system where the laws leave a
higher degree of freedom of choice to the judge, i.e. when there is uncertainty about the listener’s
type, decreasing the severity of unfavorable legal action relative to the favorable one would affect
evidence disclosed in equilibrium, positively.
1 Evidence Disclosure Game
A defendant (he) is facing a judge (she) in a legal proceeding. The judge chooses an action that
determines the utility of the defendant. The defendant sends a message m to the judge in order to
persuade the judge to take a favorable legal action. The defendant faces uncertainty about how the
judge would evaluate the evidence. Turning back to the example of the tort case presented in the
introduction, a lenient judge might decide to reduce the defendant’s punishment when mediocre
results are presented to court while a strict judge might increase the punishment of the defendant
for the same test results. There are two pieces of information related to judge’s preferred action
for the case. The first piece of information is about the nature of evidence, denoted by x. The
second piece of information is the type of the judge and that determines how she (the judge)
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evaluates what is presented to her. The evidence is hard in the sense that if the defendant has
evidence, then he can either disclose the evidence or hide it, but cannot forge or manipulate the
evidence. In the tort case example, the producer who tested their product can show the results
to the court or can hide them, but forging fake results is extremely costly. The defendant might
be informed or uninformed in the sense that he may or may not have evidence. The informed
defendant observes evidence x drawn from the interval [0, 1] in the beginning of the game. The
uninformed defendant’s type is denoted with xo and if the defendant is uninformed he does not
observe any evidence, he is a producer who has not tested his product before sending it to the
market. The type space for the defendant is Θ = [0, 1] ∪ {xo}. The prior probability on Θ is
atomless on [0, 1] and Q(xo) > 0. Modeling the uninformed type xo as a separate point in the
type space enables me to model the behavior of a judge who wants to base her decision solely
on the available evidence if there exists some evidence and who wants to decide on bare-bones
facts of the case if there exists no evidence. This way of modeling is in contrast to the judge
described in Che and Severinov (2007). In Che and Severinov’s model the judge decides which
action to take based on her belief about the state of the nature whether the defendant is informed
or uninformed.
The type of the defendant determines what he can say in the court– in other words, which
messages are available to him. The uninformed defendant’s message set consists of one message
mo. The informed defendant who observes evidence x has the message set Mx = {mx,mo}.
Message mo is available to all types of the defendant and peculiar to none. This characteristic of
mo leads it to be interpreted as suppressing evidence, if it is sent by an informed type. The set of
messages available in the evidence disclosure game isM = [0, 1]∪{mo}. This message structure
is widely used in disclosure games with verifiable information as seen in Milgrom (1981), Dye
(1986), Shin (1998) and Che and Severinov (2007) 2. The judge evaluates the evidence according
to her private information which is her type j ∈ J. The variable j represents the judge’s inter-
pretation of how the evidence fits in the case given the judge’s personal character and his private
knowledge about the case. I assume that there is a finite number of types for the judge and denote
2This implies that the evidence is ”hard” in the sense that the defendant cannot modify the evidence. Bull and
Watson (2004) discusses implementability in settings with hard evidence. Message mo corresponds to what ”cheap
document” refers in Bull and Watson (2004) and message mx corresponds to ”positive evidence” of state x.
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the set of types with J.
When the defendant sends mo, the judge forms beliefs regarding whether the defendant is
suppressing evidence or he is genuinely uninformed. The set of judge’s actions A = {U,N, F}
is a list of legal actions that the judge can impose on the defendant. In response to the disclosure
of the defendant, the judge may choose between three actions: Unfavorable (U), Neutral (N) and
Favorable (F). For the tort case example these three actions can be interpreted as reducing the
compensation that the defendant has to pay, not changing it, or increasing the compensation.
The defendant’s utility depends on the action the judge chooses but not on his type, and
his utility is described by the function v : A → R such that v(F ) > v(N) > v(U). The
defendant chooses his disclosure strategy to get a favorable decision from the judge. Without
loss of generality, let v(N) = 0.
The judge’s utility depends on the action she chooses, the type of the defendant, and the type
of the judge. As in Daughety and Reinganum (2000) and Che and Severinov (2007), the judge
chooses her action according to given legal standards. The legal standard is described by three
values: bF , bN , bU such that bF > bN > bU . For any pair (j, θ), the judge evaluates the case
by a function g : J × Θ → [bU , bF ] and chooses an action. The utility function of the judge
u : J× A×Θ→ R is given by a squared loss function similar to Shin (1998)
uj(a, θ) = −(g(j, θ)− ba)2
Without loss of generality, I assume that bN = 0. The legal standards may be interpreted as a
standard measure of the degree of the guilt of the defendant with which the judge compares her
private evaluation of the case. The judge’s utility is negatively related to the difference between
her evaluation and the legal standards that correspond to the action she chose. If the evaluation
is closer to bF than bN or bU , then she decides the most suitable action is F ; whereas a value
closer to some other ba implies that she chooses a. Upon a tie between two actions, the judge
may choose either action or may choose to randomize between two actions.
The evaluation function satisfies two properties for all types of the judge.
Assumption 1. For all j the evaluation function g(j, x) is continuous and monotone increasing
in x ∈ [0, 1].
6
Similar to Che and Severinov (2007), Assumption 1 implies that the higher x is more favorable
for the defendant regardless of the type of the judge. But different types of judge may differ on
their evaluations for a specific x 3. For example, a strict type of judge may decide to take action
N upon receiving evidence x but a more lenient type may decide to take action F .
Assumption 2. For all j the evaluation function g(j, x) satisfies
g(j, 1) = bF and g(j, 0) = bU
Assumption 2 states that all types of judge agree on how to evaluate the highest and lowest
evidence in the sense that all types wants to take action F when x = 1 and U when x = 0.
Assumption 3. For all j, g(j, xo) = 0.
Note that absence of evidence corresponds to a bare-bones case in this model. The action chosen
by the judge in a bare-bones case is called the neutral action (N). Note that this does not mean that
the judge will automatically choose N upon receiving mo, in that case she updates her beliefs
as described in the equilibrium definition and chooses an action accordingly. Also the judge
may choose N when some evidence is disclosed when her evaluation of the statement is close to
O. Assumption 3 merely states that if the judge knew that the case was a bare-bones case with
certainty, then she would choose N .
The evidence disclosure game is denoted by Γ(Θ, P,A) when the type of the judge is not
observable and with Γ(Θ, j,A) when the type of the judge is known to be j. The defendant’s
strategy is a function that assigns a probability distribution on messages to each type of the de-
fendant, d : Θ → M, d(x) ∈ ∆Mx. The decision strategy of judge of type j is a function that
gives a probability distribution over the set of actions for each message, fj : M→ ∆A.
Upon receiving a message m, the judge forms beliefs about the type of the defendant and
chooses an action accordingly. The action of the judge depends on the expected utility calculation
of the judge given her beliefs about the type of the defendant. Upon receiving a message m, the
judge is said to be best responding given beliefs µ if the action a∗ she chooses solves the problem
max
a
Eµ(−(g(j, θ)− ba)2|m) (1)
3See Seidmann (2005) for an evidence disclosure model in which defendant’s evidence is not ranked the same
by different types of the decision maker.
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That is, a∗ is a maximizing choice for j if and only if
−
∫
Θ
(g(j, θ)− ba∗)2dµ(θ|m) ≥ −
∫
Θ
(g(j, θ)− ba)2dµ(θ|m) (2)
for all a. This is equivalent to∫
Θ
[2g(j, θ)ba∗ − b2a∗ ]dµ(θ|m) ≥
∫
Θ
[2g(j, θ)ba − b2a]dµ(θ|m)
Rearranging the terms yields
Eµ(g(j, θ)|mo)(ba∗ − ba) ≥ b
2
a∗ − b2a
2
For ba∗ > ba, this is equivalent to
Eµ(g(j, θ)|m) ≥ ba∗ + ba
2
(3)
and for ba∗ < ba
Eµ(g(j, θ)|m) ≤ ba∗ + ba
2
(4)
Inequalities 3 and 4 yield cutoffs that the judge compares her evaluation with, and chooses an
action accordingly. Since bN = 0, it follows 3 and 4 from a∗ = H if and only if
bF ≥ Eµ(g(j, θ)|m) ≥ bF
2
And similarly, a∗ = N if and only if,
bF
2
≥ Eµ(g(j, θ)|m) ≥ bU
2
I introduce the following cutoffs
cF =
bF
2
and cN =
bU
2
(5)
When the judge’s evaluation is less than cN , she takes action U ; when it is in between two cutoffs,
she takes action N ; and when the evaluation is greater than the second threshold, she takes action
F .
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2 Equilibrium Analysis
I employ an equilibrium notion under which the judge makes a Bayesian inference upon receiving
mo and the beliefs of the judge is derived from the equilibrium strategy of the defendant 4.
Definition. A Sequential Equilibrium of disclosure game is a tuple consisting of the judge’s
strategy {f ∗1 , .., f ∗J}, the defendant’s strategy d∗, and beliefs of the judge µ such that:
1. The defendant’s strategy d∗ is a best response to f ∗. That is, if d∗(x) = m, then
∑
a
∑
j
v(a)f ∗j (a|m)P (j) = maxmˆ∈{x,mo}
∑
a
∑
j
v(a)f ∗j (a|mˆ)P (j) (6)
for all x.
2. If f ∗j (a|m) > 0, then a is a best response for beliefs µ, i.e. a solves (1).
3. For every Borel subset X of Θ, µ(θ ∈ X|m = mo) is derived from d∗ via Bayes’ rule and
for every x ∈ [0, 1], µ(θ = x|m = x) = 1.
As usual in this type of games, the equilibrium is not unique. On the contrary in some cases
there are uncountably many equilibrium disclosure strategies for the defendant. Rather than
analyzing all possible equilibrium strategies, focusing on a particular plausible set of equilibrium
makes it possible to study informativeness of equilibrium disclosures. Below, I introduce the
specific set of disclosure strategy that this paper focuses on.
Definition. The speaker strategy d is called a threshold strategy if there exists a threshold x
x ≤ x implies d(mo|x) = 1, and x < x implies d(m = x|θ = x) = 1
4In the United States, defendants are protected from self incrimination by the right to silence. The effects of
this protection is frequently debated in the literature and some scholars contend that the right to silence leads to a
separating equilibrium, see Seidmann and Stein (2000). In most cases the jury members are advised not to make
negative inferences when a defendant uses that right. However, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 of the
UK allows adverse inferences to be drawn from silence. Also in the United States many studies show that contrary
to instructions given, jury members make inferences upon silence in reality. For example, the National Legal Poll
(1998) of National Law Association indicated that % 40 of the potential jurors would draw a negative inference from
the defendants refusal to testify
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Threshold strategies offer a natural way of comparing evidence disclosure strategies of the
defendant: A disclosure is said to be more informative if the threshold is lower. Another advan-
tage of threshold strategies is that they are practical from the perspective of the defendant, the
defendant just determines a value and suppresses any evidence that is worse than that value.
The formal definition of informativeness of a disclosure strategy is given below.
Definition. A threshold strategy d with threshold x is said to be at least as informative as the
threshold strategy dˆ with threshold xˆ if
x ≤ xˆ
Next, I show that there exists SE with threshold strategies.
Theorem 1 UnderA1−2, there exists a SE {f ∗1 , .., f ∗J , d∗, µ} such that d∗ is a threshold strategy.
Proof. Assume that the defendant uses a threshold disclosure strategy d∗ with threshold x. The
beliefs µ of the judge that are derived this strategy via Bayes’ rule are such that
µ(xo|mo) = Q(xo)
Q(xo) +Q[0, x]
(7)
and,
µ(X|mo) =
∫
X
dQ(x)
Q(xo) +Q[0, x]
(8)
for every Borel subset X of [0, x].
Upon receiving mo, the expected evaluation of the judge given belief µ of (7) and (8) is
Eµ(g(j, θ)|mo) =
∫
Θ
g(j, θ)dµ(θ|mo) (9)
Using (8) and g(j, xo) = 0, expression (9) is equal to
Q(xo)g(j, xo) +
∫ x
0
g(j, x)dQ(x)
Q(xo) +Q[0, x]
(10)
Let convS denote the convex hull of a set S. Consider a correspondence Ψj : [bL, bH ]⇒ R
Ψ(k) := conv{v(a)|ca+ ≥ k ≥ ca} (11)
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where ca+ denote the cutoff that is higher than and adjacent to ca and for completeness of
notation let cU = bU and cF+ = bF . Note that when message m is received, the judge’s best
response is a∗ if and only if
ca∗+ ≥ Eµ(g(j, θ)|m) ≥ ca∗ (12)
Correspondence Ψ(k) gives the possible set of utilities of the defendant when the judge’s
evaluation of the evidence is equal to k. The correspondence Ψ is convex, compact valued,
and upper-hemicontinuous. In order to show that there exists a threshold equilibrium, it suffices
to show that there exists x∗ such that a type of the defendant who observes x∗ is indifferent
between disclosing it or sending mo if the judge uses (12) to choose an action. If the defendant is
indifferent between disclosing the evidence and sendingmo at x∗, then for any x > x∗, disclosing
is at least as good as sending mo and for any x < x∗ sending mo is at least as good as disclosing
the evidence.
Consider the correspondence
h(x) =
∑
j
Ψ(g(j, x))P (j)−
∑
j
Ψ(
Q(xo)g(j, xo) +
∫ x
0
g(j, x)dQ(x)
Q(xo) +Q[0, x]
)P (j) (13)
The first term on the right hand side of (13) is the set of possible expected utilities of the
defendant when the defendant discloses x and the judge gives a best response to the defendant.
The second term on the RHS is the set of expected utilities of the defendant when he sends mo
and the judge’s evaluation is given by (9) where µ is defined by (8) for threshold x∗. If there
exists x∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that 0 ∈ h(x∗), then
∑
j
Ψ(g(j, x∗))P (j) =
∑
j
Ψ(
Q(xo)g(j, xo) +
∫ x∗
0
g(j, x)dQ(x)
Q(xo) +Q[0, x∗]
)P (j)
Such x∗ is a threshold above which the defendant prefers to disclose the evidence and under
which the defendant prefers to send mo while the judge is giving a best response to the disclosure
strategy with a threshold x∗. I want to show such x∗ exists. Function g(j, x) is continuous in
x ∈ [0, 1] and h is an upper-hemicontinuous, compact and convex valued correspondence. By
Assumption 2, h(1) ≥ 0 and h(0) ≤ 0. Therefore by the Intermediate Value Theorem for
correspondences, see de Clippel (2008), there exists x∗ such that 0 ∈ h(x∗). Therefore,
0 ∈
∑
j
Ψ(g(j, x∗))P (j)−
∑
j
Ψ(
Q(xo)g(j, xo) +
∫ x∗
0
g(j, x)dQ(x)
Q(xo) +Q[0, x∗]
)P (j) (14)
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This implies that x∗ is a threshold such that if the defendant observes x∗, then he is indifferent
between disclosing the evidence or sending mo, so (20) characterizes a threshold equilibrium.
The utility function of the judge implies that the only objective of the judge is to choose the the
action that complies with exogenously defined legal standards {ba}a∈A. 5 Hence, a change in the
magnitude of legal actions does not directly affect the actions of the judge. These changes have
direct effects only on the utility of the defendant and therefore on the disclosures of the defendant.
To analyze the effects of the severity of the legal actions on the disclosures of the defendant, I
introduce a measure of severity. The measure focuses on the changes in the magnitude of least
favorable action for the defendant relative to the magnitude of most favorable action that the
judge can give for any given set of actions. Note that restricting alternative action sets to such
sets that the neutral action of the judge yields zero utility to the defendant does not lead to any
loss of generality and simplifies the exposition and therefore this restriction is employed hereon.6
LetA = {A′ such that |A′| = 3, N ′ = N} be the collection of such alternative action sets where
N is kept constant. The action sets in A should be interpreted as deviations from A in terms of
severity.
Definition. The ratio rA = |v(U)|/v(F ) measures (relative) severity of punishments in A and is
called the severity ratio.
Punishments in A are said to be more severe than A′ if rA ≥ rA′ . Some simple changes
of punishments may lead to an increase of severity ratio. For instance consider A, Aˆ ∈ A, if
v(F ′) ≤ v(F ) and v(U ′) ≥ v(U), then rA ≥ rAˆ.
It turns out that whether a change in the severity ratio has any effect on the set of equilibrium
strategies of the defendant depends on whether there is uncertainty on how the judge evaluates
the evidence. If there are well defined laws on a subject or there have been many similar cases,
then the defendant might not face uncertainty about how the evidence will be evaluated. The no-
uncertainty situation is a special case of my model where the defendant is one hundred percent
sure that the judge is some specific type. I show that if there is no uncertainty about the type
of the judge, then the set of equilibrium disclosures of the defendant are not affected when the
5This is in contrast to a model of a judge who is concerned about the appropriateness of legal standards.
6For any given alternative A′, even if v(N ′) > 0 an affine transformation of the defendant’s utility would
normalize the v(N) to be zero without changing the equilibrium strategies of the defendant.
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severity ratio changes. In the tort example, this means that if the producer knows j, then a change
in the compensation schedule does not affect his disclosure behavior. However if the defendant is
not sure which evidence invokes U , which invokes N and which one invokes F , then the changes
in the magnitude of possible legal actions do affect the disclosure behavior of the defendant.
Theorem 2 Assume A1 − 3. Let the judge’s type be known to be j. For all pair A, Aˆ ∈ A,if
d∗ is an equilibrium disclosure strategy for Γ(Θ, j,A), then it is also an equilibrium strategy for
Γ(Θ, j, Aˆ).
The formal proof of the theorem is given in the appendix. The intuition behind the proof can
be best given by a graphical example in which I will focus only on the set of threshold equilibria.
Example 1. Suppose the defendant knows that the judge’s type is j. In other words, the
defendant knows how the judge evaluates the evidence. Let Q be a uniform distribution on [0, 1]
and let Q(xo) = 0.2. Let the judge’s evaluation function when evidence is disclosed be
g(j, x) = −(2x− 1).
And the utility of the defendant is given by
v(F ) = 100, v(N) = 0, V (U) = −1
Fig.1 illustrates the judge’s evaluations when the evidence is disclosed, the evidence is on the
horizontal axis. The judge compares his evaluation g(j, x) of evidence x against cut-offs cN and
cF . For example, if the evaluation is greater than cF , then the judge chooses F .
Characterizing the equilibrium strategies requires analyzing judge’s beliefs upon receiving
mo as well. When the defendant uses a threshold strategy with threshold x, the expression for
judge’s expected evaluation (9) is calculated using Bayesian updating of her beliefs according
equation (8). The expected evaluation function of the judge is given by:
Eµx(g(j, x)) =
(x2 − x)0.8
0.2 + 0.8x
Fig.2 shows Eµx(g(j, x)) as a function of threshold x. In this case, for any threshold the
judge’s expected evaluation would be between cN and cF ; therefore, the judge chooses N .
In order to find a threshold equilibrium, it suffices to compare g(j, x) and Eµx(g(j, x)). For
xˆ to be an equilibrium threshold, type xˆ should have no incentive to deviate and disclose the
13
Figure 1: Evidence Disclosed
evidence. Further, the types above xˆ should have no incentive to deviate and suppress. Consider
a value xˆ ∈ (0, 1) that invokes the same action on Fig.1 and Fig.2. Any value above xˆ would
invoke a more favorable action than xˆ for the defendant on Fig.1. Since xˆ is indifferent between
suppressing and disclosing, at values above xˆ the defendant does not have incentive to suppress.
Therefore such an xˆ is a threshold equilibrium. The set of values for which the judge’s evaluation
on both Fig.1 and Fig.2 results in the same action are the set of threshold equilibria.
Fig.3 showsEµx(g(j, x)) and g(j, x) together as functions of x and x respectively. The values
on the horizontal axis that correspond to the same action on Eµx(g(j, x)) and g(j, x) are those
that the defendant is indifferent between disclosing the evidence or suppressing it and hence
they constitute the set of threshold equilibria. The set of threshold equilibria corresponds to the
interval between 0.25 and 0.75.
Now consider a change in the magnitude of legal actions.
v(F ′) = 1, v(N ′) = 0, v(U) = −100
This second set of actions yields a much more severe legal system, however the set of equilib-
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Figure 2: Evidence Suppressed
ria is still given by the intersection points of E(g) and g. The defendant knows which disclosures
will lead to what legal actions and he is only interested in sending the messages that will result
in the most favorable action, the magnitude of the action is immaterial. One caveat is that if the
the legal actions were changed such that ordinal preferences of the defendant are affected-for
example v(F ′) > v(N ′) = v(U ′)-then the set of equilibria would be affected. Hence, it suffices
to know v(F ) > v(N) > v(U) to find the set of equilibria and that is all that is used to find the
set of equilibria. This implies that the exact values of v(F ), v(N), v(U) are irrelevant. The set of
equilibria does not change as long as the ordinal preferences of the defendant stay the same. A
change in the severity ratio is a cardinal change and this illustrates Theorem 2.  The defendant
faces a completely different situation if there is uncertainty about the judge’s type. Next I show
that, if there is uncertainty about the type of judge, a change in severity ratio may have an effect
on the disclosures of the defendant.
Theorem 3 Assume A1− 3. Let rA and rAˆ be severity ratios for A, Aˆ ∈ A respectively. If rA >
rAˆ, then for every equilibrium threshold strategy d
∗ of Γ(Θ, P,A), there exists an equilibrium
15
Figure 3: Equilibrium
threshold strategy d∗∗ of game Γ(Θ, P, Aˆ) that is at least as informative as d∗.
Theorem 3 shows that a decrease in severity ratio of legal actions results in a change in the ev-
idence disclosures of the defendant. Proof of Theorem 3 is given in the Appendix. Note that,
Theorem 3 only states that for every disclosure strategy under the more severe regime, there is
a more informative one under the less severe legal regime. The next theorem of the paper, The-
orem 4, completes the comparison by showing that the opposite is true as well. Specifically, it
shows that for every strategy under the less severe regime, there is a more informative disclosure
strategy under the less severe regime.
Theorem 4 Assume A1− 3. Let rA and rAˆ be severity ratios for A, Aˆ ∈ A respectively.
If rA < rAˆ, then for every equilibrium threshold strategy d
∗ of Γ(Θ, P,A), there exists an equi-
librium threshold strategy d∗∗ of game Γ(Θ, P, Aˆ) that is weakly less informative than d∗.
The graph below illustrates Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. The red and blue intervals represent the
threshold equilibria. Note that in general the set of equilibria does not have to be a connected set,
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in here for expositional simplicity a set of equilibria that is connected is graphed. The red set is
a collection of points that arise as threshold equilibria under a more severe regime, the blue set
refers to the threshold equilibria under a less severe regime. The graph illustrates that an overlap
of equilibria is possible between these two regimes but even so, the less severe regime leads
to more informative disclosures for every given equilibrium disclosure strategy under the more
severe regime. It is beneficial to study the following example that shows a strict improvement in
Figure 4: Threshold Equilibria for Regimes with Different Severities
the evidence disclosed when a less severe legal system is employed. Example 2 below illustrates
a case in which a decrease in the severity of legal punishment leads to a strictly more informative
threshold equilibrium strategy under uncertainty.
Example 2. Suppose that the judge can be one of two types, J = {j1, j2}. Let the first type of
the judge be the same as in Example 1. The utility functions of two types of the judge are given
by
u1(a, x) = −((2x− 1)− ba)2
u2(a, x) = −((2 6
√
x− 1)− ba)2
17
Figure 5: Strict Judge
The evaluation functions are given by
g(j1, x) = 2x− 1
g(j2, x) = 2
6
√
x− 1
Notice that j1 is much more strict compared to j2. Type j2 thinks the evidence presented
should invoke a favorable action as long as x > 0.177978516, but for type j1 nothing below 0.75
would invoke a favorable action
As seen on Figure3 and Figure6, u2(a, x) > u1(a, x), for all x ∈ (0, 1) so that the first type’s
evaluations are always lower than the second judge’s evaluations whenever evidence is disclosed.
Therefore, the first type is called the strict type and the second type is the lenient type of.
Suppose that both types of judge are equally likely andQ is uniform on [0, 1] and letQ(xo) =
0.2. Also suppose that the legal standards that the judge uses are given by as in example 1:
bF = 1, bN = 0, bU = −1
Evaluation function g(j1, x) and the expected evaluation Eµx(g(j1, x)|mo) of type 1 is de-
picted in Fig.3. The strict type of judge (type 1) gives U to the defendant whenever there is a
18
Figure 6: Lenient Judge
disclosure x, such that x < 1
4
. The analysis in Example 1 suggests that if there is no uncertainty,
the most informative threshold equilibrium is characterized by the threshold x = 1
4
.
Now, let’s consider the other type of the judge, the lenient type. This type gives F upon
receiving any evidence such that x > 1
4
. Also note that E(g(j2, x)|mo) > −0.5 for any threshold
as seen in Fig. 6, so the lenient type of the judge gives at least a neutral action when there is no
disclosure.
To understand the effect of severity of punishments let’s consider two different legal sched-
ules. The first one yields the defendant the following payoffs: v(F ) = 1, v(N) = 0, v(U) =
−100. Under this legal regime v(N) > 1
2
v(F ) + 1
2
v(U), so the defendant prefers to choose a
disclosure that will yield a neutral action rather than take a chance that might yield the favorable
action or the unfavorable action in equal probabilities. As seen in figures 6 and 5, suppressing ev-
idence always yields at least neutral action. Therefore the most informative threshold equilibrium
in Γ(Θ, P,A) is characterized by the threshold 1
4
.
Now consider a different legal regime, a less severe one, with the following payoffs for the
defendant: v(F ′) = 100, v(N ′) = 0, v(U ′) = 1. In that case, since v(N) > 1
2
v(F ) + 1
2
v(U)
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and therefore the defendant is more incline to take chances by disclosing the evidence if he is
informed. The most informative threshold equilibrium strategy in this case is characterized by
the threshold x = 0.177978516 < 1
4
. 
3 Right to Silence
The rule of right to silence is adopted in the USA and many other countries to avid self-incrimination.
However, there is no clear evidence that a judge or jury will interpret silence as lack of evidence
under this rule, but it is clear that Bayesian updating might be a strong restriction for an evidence
disclosure model. Let’s consider the following alternative non-Bayesian updating rule following
Che and Severinov (2007):
Eˆµx(g(j, x)) = cg(j, xo) + d
∫ x
0
g(j, x)dQ(x)
c+Q(x)
(15)
where c + d = 1. The non-Bayesian updating rule allows the judge to assign a higher or
lower weight to state xo than what the probability distribution on the type space would imply.
In other words the only restriction on his beliefs is that the judge uses the same constants which
add up to one for all evidence disclosure strategies. Equation (15) is equivalent to the Bayesian
updating rule when c = Q(xo) and d = 1. 7 Next I show that the previous results apply to the
non-Bayesian game.
Theorem 5 Let the judge’s beliefs be defined by equation (15) in a non-Bayesian game Γ˜(Θ, P,A),
then there exists a game Γ(Θˆ, P,A) in which the judge’s beliefs given by Bayes’ rule is the same
with the non-Bayesian game.
Proof. For any given pair of c, d
Eˆµx(g(j, x)) = d
∫ x
0
g(j, x)dQ(x)
c+Q(x)
. (16)
This implies that Eˆµx(g(j, x)) is the Bayesian updating rule for a game Γ(Θˆ, P, A) in which
Q(xˆo) = c.
7The beliefs defined by equation (15) are not fully general in the sense that the judge uses the same c and d for
any disclosure of the defendant.
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This shows that any non-Bayesian updating game can be mapped to the Bayesian game that
was analyzed in the previous sections. Hence, the results of the previous sections apply to the
non-Bayesian game.
4 Conclusion
The relationship between incentives to commit legal offense and punishment is studied exten-
sively. This paper studies punishment in another dimension: its relationship with evidence dis-
closure. In order to study the relationship between magnitude of legal punishment and evidence
disclosure in court measures of severity and informativeness are introduced for the class of strate-
gic evidence disclosure models. It is common to have multiplicity of equilibria in game theory
models and the model in this paper has the same feature. This difficulty is partially overcame by
focusing on threshold equilibria that is convenient to rank in terms of their informativeness. The
main results are that the equilibrium disclosure of the defendant is not affected by the severity
of legal actions when there is no uncertainty on the type of the judge. With uncertainty, how-
ever, the defendant can be induced to disclose more information by decreasing severity of legal
punishment. Also it is shown that if the severity of the legal system increases, then defendant’s
equilibrium disclosures becomes less informative. This shows that in a legal system where the
laws leave a higher degree of freedom to the judge, a change in the severity ratio of legal actions
would affect the evidence disclosed. The results are robust to a class of non-Bayesian beliefs.
These results show that it is not sufficient to analyze optimality of legal punishments only from
the perspective of incentives to commit crimes, incentives to disclose evidence should be taken
to account as well. In fact, the optimal level of punishment is less severe than previous analyzes
that do not take evidence disclosure into account would indicate.
5 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Theorem 6. Take any pair of SE strategies (f ∗j , d∗) for game Γ(Θ, j,A). I will show
(f ∗, d∗) are equilibrium strategies for Γ(Θ, j, Aˆ) as well. Let’s start with defendant’s strategies.
Strategy d∗ is a best response to f ∗j . this means that any m
∗ in the support of d∗ for the defendant
with type x satisfies ∑
a
v(a)f ∗j (a|m∗) = maxm∈{x,m0}
∑
a
v(a)f ∗j (a|m) (17)
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I want to show that an alternative set of actions Aˆ ∈ A with a different severity will give rise
to exactly the same disclosure strategy as a best response. The judge’s utility function, given
by equation (1), implies that the judge is concerned by choosing an action from the schedule
of legal actions that minimizes the distance between the legal standard for that action and her
evaluation of the facts of the case. The judge is not concerned by the severity of actions, and
under an alternative schedule of legal actions the judge’s best response to any given disclosure
strategy will be the same. Hence it suffices to show that the defendant’s best response to the
judge’s action strategy does not change with the change of severity.
Analyzing the judge’s utility function shows that if f ∗j (|m∗) is a mixed strategy, then by (12)
there are at most two actions in the support of f ∗j . If there are two actions in the support, one of
the actions in the support must be N . Therefore, equation (17) holds if and only if for all action
pairs in A, a′ 6= a with v(a′) > v(a) either of the following conditions holds:
1. For all messages m that the defendant has access, f ∗j (a
′|m∗) ≥ f ∗j (a′|m) and f ∗j (a|m∗) ≤
f ∗j (a|m).
2. If there exists m ∈Mx such that f ∗j (a′|m∗) ≤ f ∗j (a′|m), then f(F |m∗) > 0.
This implies that any informed type of the defendant is either trying to maximize the proba-
bility of receiving F or minimize the probability of receiving U but not both. As a result, same
disclosure strategy is a best response for corresponding pairs aˆ, aˆ′ ∈ Aˆ. In other words, for every
m∗ such that d∗(m∗|x) > 0 satisfies∑
aˆ∈Aˆ
v(aˆ)f ∗j (aˆ|m∗) = maxm∈{x,m0}
∑
aˆ∈Aˆ
v(aˆ)f ∗j (aˆ|m) (18)
Hence the disclosure strategy of the defendant d∗ paired with the action strategy of the judge that
assigns the same probabilities to corresponding actions in the alternative legal schedule Aˆ are SE
strategies of the game Γ(Θ, j, Aˆ).
Proof of Theorem 7.
I am going to use the equilibrium characterization in the existence proof to prove Theorem 8.
Let rA > rAˆ. I am going to show that for every x such that
0 ∈
∑
j
Ψ(g(j, x))P (j)−
∑
j
Ψ(
Q(xo)g(j, xo) +
∫ x
0
g(j, x)dQ(x)
Q(xo) +Q[0, x]
)P (j) (19)
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there exists xˆ ≤ x
0 ∈
∑
j
Ψˆ(g(j, xˆ))P (j)−
∑
j
Ψˆ(
Q(xo)g(j, xo) +
∫ xˆ
0
g(j, x)dQ(x)
Q(xo) +Q[0, xˆ]
)P (j) (20)
where
Ψˆ(k) := conv{v(aˆ)|ca+ ≥ k ≥ ca}
Take threshold equilibrium strategies (f ∗, d∗) of the game Γ(Θ, P,A). Let D∅ denote the set
of types of defendant such that d∗(mo|x) = 1 and let x be the highest type of defendant that sends
mo under d∗. For all xˆ that is not an element of D∅ we have∑
a
∑
j
v(a)f ∗j (a|x)P (j) ≥
∑
a
∑
j
v(a)f ∗j (a|mo)P (j) (21)
Let γax denote the probability of receiving action a upon disclosing mx and γ
a
∅ denote the
probability of receiving a upon disclosing mo given f .
γax =
∑
j
f ∗j (a|x)P (j)
and
γa∅ =
∑
j
f ∗j (a|mo)P (j)
By (21) defendant discloses x if and only if
γFx v(F ) + γ
U
x v(U) ≥ γF∅ v(F ) + γU∅ v(U)
Therefore the defendant discloses x if
v(F )[γFx − γF∅ ] ≥ v(U)[γU∅ − γUx ] (22)
This gives for all x ≤ x
v(F )[γFx − γF∅ ] ≤ v(U)[γU∅ − γUx ] (23)
Manipulating inequality (23) is going to yield the desired result. In order do that we need
some information about γFx − γF∅ .
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Lemma 1 Let d∗ be a SE strategy of the defendant and x be the threshold under which the
defendant sends mo. If x ≥ x, then γFx − γF∅ > 0.
Proof. Take an equilibrium characterized by x. Expected value of g(x, j) conditional upon no
disclosure is given by
E[g(x, j)|mo] =
∫ x
0
g(x, j)dQ(x)
Q(xo) +Q[0, x]
This implies if E[g(x, j)|m0] ≥ cF then g(x, j) > cF . So the set of types of listener that
grants F to x is a superset of types that grant F to mo.
Now, I want to show that there exists xˆ ∈ [0, x] such that for all x ≤ xˆ, the defendant
suppresses the evidence and for all x > xˆ discloses evidence in game Γ(Θ, P, Aˆ).
Case 1. Suppose for all x ≤ x
v(Fˆ )[γFx − γF∅ ] ≤ v(Uˆ)[γU∅ − γUx ]
holds. Since x is a threshold in Γ(Θ, P,A), for all x > x we have
v(F )[γFx − γF∅ ] ≥ v(U)[γU∅ − γUx ]
If γU∅ − γUx ≥ 0, then by Lemma 1 and by the fact that v(Uˆ) < 0 we have
∀x > x, v(Fˆ )[γFx − γF∅ ] ≥ v(Uˆ)[γU∅ − γUx ]
and therefore incentives to disclose x are not changed. If γU∅ −γUx < 0, (22) and Lemma 1 implies
that
γFx − γF∅
|γU∅ − γUx |
≥ |v(U)|
v(F )
So a decrease in the severity ratio does not affect the direction of the inequality
γFx − γF∅
|γU∅ − γUx |
≥ |v(Uˆ)|
v(Fˆ )
Therefore d∗ is an equilibrium of the Γ(Θ, P, Aˆ) and the theorem holds for this case.
Case 2. The nontrivial case is that
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v(Fˆ )[γFx − γF∅ ] > v(Uˆ)[γU∅ − γUx ] (24)
By (24) the set ∑
Ψˆ(g(j, x))P (j)−
∑
Ψˆ(Eµxg(j, x))P (j)
contains a non-negative value. Moreover by A2 the difference∑
Ψˆ(g(j, 0))P (j)−
∑
Ψˆ(Eµ0g(j, x))P (j)
attains a non-positive value. Since the difference correspondence∑
Ψˆ(g(j, x))P (j)−
∑
Ψˆ(Eµxg(j, x))P (j)
is u.h.c, compact and convex valued there exists a xˆ ∈ [0, x] such that
0 ∈
∑
Ψˆ(g(j, xˆ))P (j)−
∑
Ψˆ(Eµxˆg(j, xˆ))P (j)
Therefore there exists a weakly more informative equilibrium in Γ(Θ, P, Aˆ).
Proof of Theorem 8. By Lemma (1) and inequality (23), the defendant x chooses to send mo
only if
v(F )
|v(U)| ≤
γU∅ − γUx
γFx − γF∅
As severity ratio increases
v(Fˆ )
|v(Uˆ)| <
v(F )
|v(U)| ≤
γU∅ − γUx
γFx − γF∅
This implies that ∑
Ψˆ(g(j, x))P (j)−
∑
Ψˆ(Eµxg(j, x))P (j)
contains a non-positive value. A5 implies that∑
Ψˆ(g(j, 1))P (j)−
∑
Ψˆ(Eµ1g(j, x))P (j)
attains a non-negative value. Therefore there exists xˆ ∈ [x, 1] such that
0 ∈
∑
Ψˆ(g(j, xˆ))P (j)−
∑
Ψˆ(Eµxˆg(j, xˆ))P (j)
We conclude that there exists a weakly less-informative equilibrium in Γ(Θ, P, Aˆ).
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